Privatization, competition, and corruption: how characteristics of bribe takers and payers affect bribes to utilities

By George R. G. Clarke, Lixin Colin Xu. 2004

194 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e6e61de7fdf48ee6382fad9501911d005d8647ce

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Chen Lin
2. Frank M. Song
3. F. Tarp
4. James R. Barth
5. Ping Lin
6. John Rand
7. F. González
8. J. Klomp

In Information Systems

1. Chen Lin
2. John Rand
3. Gergely Ujhelyi
4. F. Tarp
5. Dilyan Donchev
6. James R. Barth
7. Frank M. Song
8. Vanessa S. Tchamyou

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Chen Lin
2. Frank M. Song
3. James R. Barth
4. Gergely Ujhelyi
5. F. Tarp
6. Dilyan Donchev
7. Ping Lin
8. John Rand

Citations in the corpus

• Firm-Level Corruption in Vietnam (2012, background): “As mentioned by Clarke and Xu (2004), this may lead to public services being allocated according to the value that different enterprises place on the particular services, with bribes acting as an efficient discrimination mechanism.”
• Ownership, Investment Climate and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Firms (2006, unknown): “When infrastructure is poor, bribes are often required to get telephone or electricity connections (Clarke and Xu, 2004).”
• What Do Corruption Indices Measure (2014, background): “9 See Goel and Rich (1989), Seligson (2002), Svensson (2003), Clarke and Xu (2004), Golden and Picci (2005), Glaeser and Saks (2006), Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2007). 10 In a related paper, Soares (2004) uses data from the ICVS on crimes other than corruption to study the determinants of ”
• Corruption in bank lending to firms : cross-country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing (2009, background): “Clarke and Xu (2004) use enterprise-level data in 21 transition economies to examine how characteristics of the public utilities taking bribes and the firms paying bribes affect corruption in the sector.”
• Property rights protection, corporate transparency, and growth (2009, unknown): “More recent studies on the effects of bribery on firms’ profitability include Svensson (2003) and Clarke and Xu (2003). A number of papers examine the reasons why private businesses move “underground,” and consider the effects of the presence of organized crime (Alexeev, Janeba, and Osborne (2004)),”