Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings

By Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, Larry H. P. Lang. 2002

3,945 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fbf7b3e4adf92079baa4cc5267e7fb13808d598b

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance and Financial Distress: Evidence from Taiwan (2004, positive): “We follow the mentioned of Claessens et al. (2002), “suppose that a family owns 11% of the stock of publicly traded Firm A, which in turn has 21% of the stock of Firm B.”
Auditors' Governance Functions and Legal Environments: An International Investigation (2007, background): “33. OWN is included only as a control variable because it is difficult to interpret any results of ownership effects without information about the ultimate owner’s cash flow and voting rights, which can disentangle the ownership effects — the former measures the incentive alignment effects while the”
CEO Tenure in Taiwanese Family and Nonfamily Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective (2006, background): “The American common-law tradition exhibits relatively high ownership dispersion in U.S. nonfamily firms, as is the case in other countries (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 1999).”
The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value Around the World (2012, neutral): “Many studies show that firm value is adversely affected by the degree of managerial agency costs (e.g., see Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Claessens et al. (2002), and Lins (2003)).”
Family ownership and firm performance: Influence of family management, family control, and firm size (2011, background): “In East Asian countries, over two-thirds of the firms are controlled by founding families or individuals ( Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002 ).”
Stewardship or Agency? A Social Embeddedness Reconciliation of Conduct and Performance in Public Family Businesses (2011, background): “Finally, families may entrench themselves or their cronies in key positions to exert control, dispense favors, and access resources (Claessens et al. 2002).”