The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance
By Igal Hendel, Alessandro Lizzeri. 2000
294 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fbd30f3c71d54a09966809edda1c8e1e21542679
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- Raj Chetty
- Ulrike Malmendier
- Amy N. Finkelstein
- Melanie Morten
- Pierre-Andre Chiappori
- Lee M. Lockwood
- Stefano DellaVigna
- Georges Dionne
In Economics and Econometrics
- Raj Chetty
- Amy N. Finkelstein
- Stefano DellaVigna
- J. Abbring
- J. Pinquet
- Ulrike Malmendier
- Georges Dionne
- Melanie Morten
Citations in the corpus
- Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans (2014, background): “68 Pauly et al. (2011) show that guaranteed renewability can still provide full insurance against reclassification risk even with substantial informational asymmetries 69 Hendel and Lizzeri (2003).”
- Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence (2004, methodology): “As for Proposition 3(iv), we can use (20) to obtain the difference between the two lump-sum fees for the case k > 0 and β̂ = β”
- Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data (2012, background): “Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) examine issues of reclassification risk in the context of life insurance. and Snow (1985) discuss the assumptions under which the decentralized equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient in models with endogenous contracts.4”
- Incidental Bequests: Bequest Motives and the Choice to Self-Insure Late-Life Risks (2014, background): “) Hurd (1989) estimates a very weak bequest motive based on a comparison of the saving decisions of households with and without children and the assumption that households without children lack bequest motives.”
- Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data (2003, methodology): “b) and the methods for paired duration data developed by Holt and Prentice (1974) and Chamberlain (1985).”
- Temporary Migration and Endogenous Risk Sharing in Village India (2019, background): “I study the decision of a household 1 See also the application of limited commitment in labor markets (Harris and Holmstrom 1982; Thomas and Worrall 1988) and insurance markets (Hendel and Lizzeri 2003).”