Bargaining and War

By R. Wagner. 2000

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When Can Mediators Build Trust? (2006, background): “Second, if the mediator prefers 9 For the debate over whether one-time lotteries are acceptable models for war initiation, see Wagner 2000 and Powell 2004.”
Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict (2001, background): “See, for example, Fearon 1995; Gartzke 1999; and Wagner 2000.”
Bargaining and the Nature of War (2004, background): “JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 48 No. 6, December 2004 783-813 DOI: 10.1177/0022002704268026 © 2004 Sage Publications Smith 1997, 1998; Smith and Stam 2003, forthcoming; Wagner 2000).”
Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others? (2004, background): “The results explain how it is possible to have a longrunning, costly civil war for which it is implausible to argue that the main obstacle to a settlement is over-optimistic military expectations on both sides (cf. Blainey, 1973; Wagner, 2000).”
Honest Threats (2002, background): “For a discussion, see Wagner (2000) and Smith (1998c). outcome, which we normalize to a value of vA for country A and 0 for country B.”
War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization (2003, background): “They often impose ex ante costs that differentiate a resolved defender willing to protect a partner from states possessing only weak, informal alignments.13 Finally, war itself involves costly signaling (Wagner, 2000).”