Robustness and Linear Contracts

By Gabriel D. Carroll. 2015

360 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c92efa8070ce9916db5bc94f55b2245cac976169

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Qi Zhang
2. Jon M. Kleinberg
3. Manish Raghavan
4. Shaowei Ke

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Qi Zhang
2. Jon M. Kleinberg
3. Manish Raghavan
4. Shaowei Ke
5. Yajun Wang
6. Eliav Buchnik
7. Edith Cohen

Citations in the corpus

• How Do Classifiers Induce Agents to Invest Effort Strategically? (2018, background): “Recent work has sought to relax this assumption, finding that linear contracts are optimal even when the principal has incomplete knowledge of the agent’s cost structure [6].”
• Calibrated Incentive Contracts (2013, neutral): “Hurwicz and Shapiro (1978) and more recently Carroll (2012) also derive linear contracts as maxmin optimal in different contexts.”
• Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion (2020, background): “21See, among others, Bose, Ozdenoren, and Pape (2006); Bose and Daripa (2009); Bodoh-Creed (2012); Carroll (2015, 2017); Wolitzky (2016); de Castro, Liu, and Yannelis (2017a,b); Di Tillio et al. (2017); de Castro and Yannelis (2018); and Carroll and Segal (2019).”