Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing tasks using regret minimization mechanisms

By Adish Kumar Singla, Andreas Krause. The Web Conference, 2013

301 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computer Science Applications, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f8b4313470c04cfd8c0b78cf93d0be69f1c44672

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In Computer Science Applications

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

How to crowdsource tasks truthfully without sacrificing utility: Online incentive mechanisms with budget constraint (2014, background): “[30] presented pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets based on the bidding model and the posted price model respectively.”
Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits (2019, background): “) In dynamic procurement (e.g., Badanidiyuru et al., 2012, 2018; Singla and Krause, 2013) the algorithm is a buyer and the agents are sellers; alternatively, the algorithm is a contractor on a crowdsourcing market and the agents are workers.”
Data Collection and Wireless Communication in Internet of Things (IoT) Using Economic Analysis and Pricing Models: A Survey (2016, background): “authors in [192] proposed to use the posted price model based on the link between the reverse auctions and the multi-armed”
Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing: Crowdsourcing With Smartphones (2016, methodology): “Using a different approach, Singla and Krause [40] presented a novel, no-regret posted price mechanism in stochastic online settings.”
CrowdFill: collecting structured data from the crowd (2014, background): “, the lowest wage a worker is willing to accept), more recent studies [20, 21] propose an alternative approach where workers indicate their desired wage by submitting a bid.”
Incentivizing exploration (2014, background): “Several recent papers (e.g., [Abraham et al. 2013; Badanidiyuru et al. 2012, 2013; Ho et al. 2013; Singla and Krause 2013]) have drawn a connection between MAB models and crowd-sourcing of tasks.”
Bandits with Knapsacks (2013, methodology): “A “dual” problem to dynamic pricing is dynamic procurement [5], [14], where the algorithm is “dynamically buying” rather than “dynamically selling”.”