The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-country Analysis

By Tatiana Nenova. 2000

242 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f33ec9a271f3050d7206ee48e1f2020cfe15490a

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Citations in the corpus

Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison (2002, unknown): “Claessens et al. (2000a), Nenova (2000), and Dyck and Zingales (2002) find that private control benefits are negatively associated with stronger outsider protection and legal enforcement.”
Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets (2003, unknown): “Finally, irrespective of pyramiding, managers of a given firm sometimes issue and own shares with superior voting rights to achieve control rights that exceed their cash flow rights in the firm (Zingales (1994), Nenova (2003)).”
Corporate Governance and Control (2003, unknown): “72 A second paper by Pagano and Volpin (2002) shifts the focus to the internal politics of the firm, arguing that there is a natural alliance between management and employees in staving off hostile bids. 73 As we discuss below, there has been substantially more systematic historical analysis of the ”
The relationship among family business, corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from the Mexican stock exchange (2012, background): “…and Pontiff (1993), Bebchuk (1999), Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002), Faccio and Lang (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2002), Morck et al. (2000), Nenova (2000) and Rajan and Zingales (2001) argue that concentrated ownership causes an exchange of corporate profits for private benefit.”
Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms (2009, background): “Perhaps the closest precursor to our study is Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003) (hereafter DPSW).”
Family Control and the Rent–Seeking Society (2003, unknown): “Barclay and Holderness (1989), Barclay et al. (1993), Morck et al. (2000), Nenova (2000) , Faccio”