Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

By Christian Leuz, D. Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki. 2002

2,087 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a3d28e5474ca848484667fc1ae509a859c65f4fc

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Citations in the corpus

Disclosure, Corporate Governance, and the Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from Asia's Emerging Markets (2003, positive): “Because large shareholders control the information production process and they are not constrained by strong legal enforcement, financial reporting in emerging markets is more prone to manipulation (Leuz et al. 2003).”
The Real Effects of Mandatory Quarterly Reporting (2017, background): “We also include a measure for the overall country-year level of enforcement (Enforcement) because prior literature suggests that AEM is constrained by the level of enforcement (Leuz et al. 2003) and, in turn, drives RAM.”
Real earnings management in family firms: Evidence from an emerging economy (2016, background): “The poor legal protection for investors has been found to be positively related to poor quality reported earnings (Leuz et al., 2003).”
When Firms Talk, Do Investors Listen? The Role of Trust in Stock Market Reactions to Corporate Earnings Announcements (2012, background): “That is, these variables are endogenous and, more critically, have been shown to be driven by trust, investor protection, and disclosure requirements (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004, 2008)).”
The economic value of regulated disclosure: Evidence from the banking sector (2006, background): “…Alford et al., 1993; Francis et al., 2003; Geunther and Young, 2000; Land and Lang, 2003); earnings management (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003); earnings timeliness (e.g., Ball et al., 2000); audit quality (e.g., Francis et al., 2003); and analyst activity (e.g., Bushman et…”
Staggered Boards and Earnings Management (2008, background): “Prior studies, including those analyzing international settings (e.g., Fan and Wong 2002; Leuz et al. 2003), generally assume that weak governance exacerbates earnings management intended to conceal managerial expropriation.”