Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts

By Gary H. Stern, Ron J. Feldman. 2004

466 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f2720e58759157cf188be128e4c73edcec8e63ed

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Citations in the corpus

Toward a Theory of Public Entrepreneurship (2010, background): “Theoretical and empirical examination of the concept of the public interest is analogous to examination of the concept of corporate performance: despite the challenges, the process of inquiry itself delivers rich insights about the phenomena.”
Stress tests and small business lending (2018, unknown): “Moral hazard incentives from deposit insurance and ‘too big to fail’ expectations can induce banks to supply too much risky credit (Feldman and Stern, 2004; Strahan, 2013; Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor, 2016).”
How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important? (2009, unknown): “…we look at the purchase premiums that acquiring banking organizations are willing to offer to buy a target organization and 7 See Stern (2009a, b), Stern and Feldman (2004, 2009), and Mishkin (2006) for the various policy measures currently being discussed for reducing potential distortions…”
Has Finance Made the World Riskier (2006, background): “These are important issues, but I have little to add to excellent treatments elsewhere (see, for example, Stern and Feldman (2004)).”
Competition and Stability in European Banking: A Regional Analysis (2013, unknown): “This may further increase moral hazard and encourage large banks to take-on excessive risks leading to financial instability (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990; Stern and Feldman, 2004; Brown and Dinc, 2009; Herring and Carmassi, 2010; Beck et al., 2010 and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010).”
Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and financial system risks (2006, background): “For an opposing view, see Stern and Feldman (2004).”
Are Banks Too Big to Fail? Measuring Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions (2010, background): “Furthermore, such a moral hazard problem will provide an incentive for firms to grow in order to be perceived as " too big to fail " (see Stern and Feldman 2004 for more discussions on the moral hazard problem).”
Crisis-Related Shifts in the Market Valuation of Banking Activities (2012, unknown): “Large banks may enjoy implicit government subsidies – that is, they may be perceived to be ‘‘too big to fail’’ (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990; Stern and Feldman, 2004).”
The Impact of Green Lending on Credit Risk in China (2018, unknown): “The significant impact of credit quality [71], ROA [72], and inefficiency, as well as the size of a bank [73] suggests that the NPL ratio of Chinese banks is influenced by variables that also have an effect on the NPL ratio of banks outside of China.”
Financial Innovation, Regulation, and Reform (2009, background): “That failure reflects (a) problems in measuring bank risk resulting from regulation’s ill-considered reliance on credit rating agencies assessments and internal bank models to measure risk, and (b) the too-big-to-fail problem (Stern and Feldman 2004), which makes it difficult to credibly enforce eff”