Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and financial system risks

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Intermediary Asset Pricing (2013, background): “The differential behavior of the banking sector in 2008 is reflective of a broader pattern of reintermediation during financial downturns, as documented by Gatev and Strahan ( 2006 ) and Pennacchi ( 2006 ) .”
Systemic Risk and Deposit Insurance Premiums (2009, background): “…deposit insurance provider—should not only increase in relation to individual bank failure risk but also in relation to joint bank failure risk.2 2 Pennacchi (2006) shows that if insurance premiums are set to a bank’s expected losses and fail to include a systematic risk premium, banks that…”
Back to the Basics in Banking? A Micro-Analysis of Banking System Stability (2009, unknown): “Both Coval et al. (2009) and Pennacchi (2006) argue that the existing capital requirements may have subsidized systematic risks.”
Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design (2006, unknown): “An extensive literature analyzes the public and private benefits and costs of explicit deposit insurance and explores theoretically the challenges of designing an optimal deposit insurance system (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Pennacchi, 1987; Kane, 1995; Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Pennacchi, 2006”
Bank Liquidity Creation (2009, background): “Pennacchi (2006) confirms the existence of synergies between loan commitments and deposit taking, but finds that such synergies do not hold prior to the creation of FDIC deposit insurance.”