Mechanisms of social cognition.

By ChrisD . Frith, Uta Frith. Annual Review of Psychology, 2012

838 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f21a0a4f47b26681e0a8713d6115f0d04481d62d

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Citations in the corpus

Metacognition: computation, biology and function (2012, background): “The ability to reap cooperative beneﬁt requires reﬂection on performance, communication of conﬁdence to others and comparison of one’s conﬁdence with that of the group, and metacognition presumably plays a central role in this process [46].”
The relation between statistical power and inference in fMRI (2017, background): “Is it sensible to talk about the brain region supporting, say, mentalizing about other people [45,46], or should we expect mentalization to activate diffuse brain networks that collectively comprise a large portion of the brain?”
From Mind Perception to Mental Connection: Synchrony as a Mechanism for Social Understanding (2012, background): “Reflecting upon differences requires a network of neural activity that can be dissociated from the network supporting synchrony (Frith & Frith, 2012).”
Are there specialized circuits for social cognition and are they unique to humans? (2013, background): “Although some social skills might be uniquely human, for example ‘Theory of Mind’ — the inferring of another’s beliefs and intentions [18 ], there are likely to be other more basic social skills that are possessed by a range of primates.”
Empathy: a motivated account. (2014, neutral): “Such inferences often follow from observers’ “lay theories” concerning how events affect others’ experiences (Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009; Frith & Frith, 2012; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Heider, 1958; Mitchell, 2009; Ong, Zaki, & Goodman, 2014; Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004).”
Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain (2016, background): “A simple classification, from ‘low’ to ‘high’ levels, would range from experiences of being and having a body (10) (63) (64), through to the experience of perceiving the world from a particular point of view (a first person perspective, see (65) (66)), to experiences of intention and agency (67) (68”
Self-awareness, self-regulation, and self-transcendence (S-ART): a framework for understanding the neurobiological mechanisms of mindfulness (2012, background): “Brain areas that are involved in mentalizing include TPJ, TP, AIC, precuneus, DMPFC, while the ACC, IFG, pSTS, and IPL have been implicated more with prosociality and empathic concern and experience sharing (Singer and Lamm, 2009; Frith and Frith, 2012; Fan et al., 2011; Roy et al., 2012).”
The Varieties of Self-Transcendent Experience (2017, background): “Parietal regions associated with STEs, like the inferior parietal lobe and tempero-parietal junction, have been closely connected to theory of mind and mentalization (Decety & Chaminade, 2003; Frith & Frith, 2012).”
Familiarity matters: A review on prioritized processing of personally familiar faces (2018, background): “These included regions associated with “Theory of Mind” (ToM) (the medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction; Frith & Frith, 2012; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), retrieval of information from long termmemory (precuneus; Burgess, Maguire, Spiers, & O’Keefe, 2001; Fletcher et al., 1995;…”
The Social Bayesian Brain: Does Mentalizing Make a Difference When We Learn? (2014, background): “by their beliefs rather than by physical reality, even if these beliefs happen to be false [1].”
Interpersonal emotion regulation. (2013, background): “These empathic components are neurally and behaviorally dissociable (Decety, 2011; Frith & Frith, 2012; Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Zaki, 2013; Zaki, Weber, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2009), but both depend on Person A’s ability to effectively express his affect (Snodgrass, Hecht, & Ploutz-Snyder, 1998; Zaki,…”