Regulatory Capture: A Review
By Ernesto Dal Bó. 2006
882 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f217f3c7339a2bd546a40a6d1f2dc5e15e032636
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Citations in the corpus
- Assessing the regulatory challenges of emerging disruptive technologies (2021, background): “…on answering basic questions such as whether or not regulation should be deployed in the first place (e.g. Demsetz 1968) or examining the mature stages of a regulatory body in which the regulators have been “captured” by the industry they regulate (e.g. Bernauer 2003; Dal Bo 2006; Carpenter 2010).”
- Capabilities and strategic entrepreneurship in public organizations (2013, neutral): “We show how these processes can occur even without regulatory capture by private interests, a prevalent explanation in the agency-theoretic and transaction cost literatures (see Dal Bo [2006] for a review of both the theory and empirical literatures on regulatory capture).”
- Regulatory Markets for AI Safety (2019, neutral): “…corruption and through more subtle mechanisms: campaign finance and lobbying, overlapping industry and regulator professional networks, the dependence of regulators on information supplied by industry, etc. (Dal Bo, 2006) Regulatory markets put an additional layer between governments and industry.”
- Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry: 1996–2008 (2009, neutral): “Monsanto has also been very effective in translating their economic power into political power through methods such as lobbying and the ̳revolving door‘ between governments and industry [62].”
- Corporate Social Responsibility and Freedom of Association Rights (2012, neutral): “The theory observes that capture is possible because interest group stakes in the policy outcome are strong while the general public’s concern is more dispersed, especially over time, as the original “supportive constituency” dissipates as participants focus their energy elsewhere.(10) The possibili”
- Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2012, neutral): “A central conceptual device within this literature is the notion of ‘regulatory capture’, the idea that the content of regulation is actively designed by, and in the interests of, the regulated industry itself (Bo, 2006; Stigler, 1971).”
- Lords of the Harvest: Third-Party Influence and Regulatory Approval of Genetically Modified Organisms (2013, neutral): “Second, prior work has generally examined the macro-level influences of public policy on entire industries, whereas there has been sparse inquiry into organizational-level regulatory outcomes (Dal Bo, 2006; Trumbull, 2012).”