Managerial Agency and Bond Covenants

By Sudheer Chava, Praveen Kumar, Arthur D. Warga. 2010

331 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f038b2c8aedb2cbd6d03522d6d1545071daa289d

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In Accounting

1. Christopher S. Armstrong
2. W. Guay
3. Joseph P. Weber
4. Marti G. Subrahmanyam
5. Florian Nagler
6. R. Jankowitsch
7. G. He
8. J. Payne

In Finance

1. Christopher S. Armstrong
2. W. Guay
3. R. Jankowitsch
4. Florian Nagler
5. Marti G. Subrahmanyam
6. G. He
7. J. Payne
8. Joseph P. Weber

Citations in the corpus

• Seeking Safety: The Relation between CEO Inside Debt Holdings and the Riskiness of Firm Investment and Financial Policies (2012, unknown): “…Fang, and Gong, 2010; Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2010a), the use of restrictive covenants in debt contracts (Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong, 2010; Chava, Kumar, and Warga, 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010; Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2010a), and accounting conservatism (Chen, Dou, and Wang, 2010; Wang,…”
• Strategic Ownership Structure and the Cost of Debt (2012, background): “We also do not endogenize nonpricing characteristics of loan contracts, such as loan maturity (Leland and Toft 1996), restrictive covenants (Chava, Kumar, and Warga 2010), and the number of creditors (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996).”
• Equity or Debt Financing: Does Good Corporate Governance Matter? (2012, unknown): “Debt holders have direct protective mechanisms such as debt covenants for ensuring repayments of fixed amounts of interest and principal (Chava et al., 2010) and, therefore, need to rely less on corporate governance mechanisms which offer indirect protection.”
• Who Uses Financial Reports and for What Purpose? Evidence from Capital Providers (2014, unknown): “Overall, firms with more opaque accounting have more restrictive covenants (Chava et al., 2010), while firms with restated financial statements agree to additional covenants in subsequent contracts to appease the concerns of lenders (Graham et al., 2008).”
• Bank reputation in the private debt market (2010, background): “…might trade off restrictive covenants for a higher spread in a different way than other arrangers, as suggested by the Agency Theory of Covenants or the Costly Contracting Hypothesis (see for a related discussion, for example, Bradley and Roberts, 2004; Reisel, 2004; and Chava et al., 2010).”
• The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality (2015, background): “Furthermore, Anantharaman et al. (2012), Chen et al. (2011), and Chava et al. (2010) find fewer bond covenant restrictions and a lower cost of debt financing for firms that have larger CEO inside debt.”
• The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “Although Bharath et al. (2008) focus on the association between security and maturity, recent papers by Chava et al. (2010) and Beatty, Liao, and Weber (2010) examine other contract features, such as investment and dividend payout restrictions, and the use of cross-acceleration provisions.”
• The Determinants of Recovery Rates in the US Corporate Bond Market (2014, methodology): “We follow the approach taken by Chava et al. (2010) to group bond covenants into four main categories (investment, dividend, financing, and event), relying on the framework provided by Smith and Warner (1979).”