Ratings Quality Over the Business Cycle
By Heski Bar-Isaac, Joel Shapiro. 2013
314 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e2a81289a05ce72919a8cce4ca72b73cc02249cd
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Luc Laeven
- Thorsten Beck
- Stijn Claessens
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
- Kalina B. Manova
- Nuria Suárez
- K. Tzioumis
- F. González
In Finance
- Luc Laeven
- F. González
- Thorsten Beck
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
- Fabián Valencia
- Nuria Suárez
- Stijn Claessens
- Ross Levine
Citations in the corpus
- Credit Ratings and the Evolution of the Mortgage-Backed Securities Market (2011, unknown): “corporate bond market, a small number of large issuers of MBS brought many deals to the ratings agencies and thus had substantial bargaining power over them.(2) Theoretical research (e.”
- Estimating the Costs of Issuer-Paid Credit Ratings (2013, unknown): “4 The model of Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) similarly suggests countercyclicality of rating accuracy; CRAs are more likely to inflate ratings when income from fees is especially high and default probabilities are low.”
- Corporate Governance: What’s Special About Banks? (2013, background): “These conflicts of interests can be particularly pronounced during boom periods, when there is strong demand for banking assets (Bar-Isaac & Shapiro 2013).”
- Are All Ratings Created Equal? The Impact of Issuer Size on the Pricing of Mortgage-Backed Securities (2012, unknown): “Perverse incentives of the rating agencies worsen during market booms, when the short-term benefits of additional rating business net of potential reputational costs are the highest (e.g., Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2010), Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012)).”