Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects

By Armando Gomes. 2000

563 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ee1caa862223d8896b5b90aba8d3504d5d08c780

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Citations in the corpus

Innovation and Family Ownership: Empirical Evidence from India (2014, background): “Moreover, managers in publicly traded family firms tend to develop a reputation for not expropriating minority shareholders and, consequently, minority shareholders support the family owners because the family owners control the managers in emerging markets (Gomes, 2000).”
Business environment and the incorporation decision (2004, background): “See Shannon (1932) for a discussion of the historical evidence in 19th century Britain.”
Strategic IPOs and product market competition (2011, unknown): “Journal of Financial 4 This is a common assumption in the literature that examines interactions between entrepreneurs and diversified investors (e.g., Gomes, 2000; and Bitler, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2005).”
Formal Versus Informal Finance : Evidence from China (2008, unknown): “Gomes (2000) shows that minority shareholders invest in initial public offerings even in environments with poor investor protection rights, since controlling shareholders commit implicitly not to expropriate them because of reputation concerns.”
Company reputation and the cost of equity capital (2014, unknown): “Gomes (2000) demonstrates analytically that companies can sell shares to minority shareholders in an initial public offering (IPO) without explicit governance mechanisms to protect these minority shareholders because reputation concerns cause controlling shareholders to implicitly commit to not…”
Internal Capital Market and Dividend Policies: Evidence from Business Groups (2014, unknown): “Our paper is also related to the enormous literature that emphasizes the agency aspects of dividends (e.g., Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986; Hart and Moore 1994; Fluck 1999; Gomes 2000).”
Private vs State Ownership and Earnings Management: evidence from Chinese listed companies (2007, background): “Highly concen- trated ownership may also serve as a signal for reputation-building by controlling owners, because they know expropriation will cause minority shareholders to discount share prices and thereby reduce their wealth (Gomes, 2000).”
Family Control and Ownership Monitoring in Family-Controlled Firms in Japan (2010, unknown): “An alternative explanation is that dividend payouts address agency problems (Gomes, 2000; Jensen, 1986).”
Does financial structure matter for economic growth? A corporate finance perspective (2000, background): “Gomez (2000) provides a model where reputation makes equity valuable even in the absence of a legal system that protects minority shareholders.”