Does financial structure matter for economic growth? A corporate finance perspective

By René M. Stulz. 2000

207 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aa580a352d5fd4e0747dfab3fee217b97591a609

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Ownership Structure and the Choice Between Bank Debt and Public Debt (2013, unknown): “First, short-maturity debt increases monitoring intensity since the borrowing firm is subject to more frequent scrutiny by creditors, underwriters, and rating agencies at issuance or renewal (Stulz, 2000; Datta et al., 2005).”
Managerial Stock Ownership and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt (2005, unknown): “As short-term debt comes up for frequent renewal, Stulz (2000) states that “short-term debt can be an extremely powerful tool to monitor management.””
Financial Development, Financial Structure and Domestic Investment: International Evidence (2005, background): “1 Also see Stulz (2001) for a discussion of the links between financial structure and corporate financing.”
Corporate Boards and the Leverage and Debt Maturity Choices (2007, unknown): “Past research, including Grossman and Hart (1982), Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), Hart and Moore (1995), Rajan and Winton (1995) and Stulz (2000) , has suggested leverage and debt maturity structure as effective ways to mitigate this agency problem.”
Finance and economic growth - a review of theory and the available evidence (2001, background): “Overall, it is important that the financial structure is complete offering financing through banks and financial markets and being sufficiently adaptive to allow the evolution of financial 40 The argument has been brought forward by Stulz (2000), Rajan/Zingales (2000b).”
Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, background): “Stulz (2001) points out that short-term debt can be an extremely powerful tool for monitoring corporate insiders.”
Finance and Innovation: The Case of Publicly Traded Firms (2007, unknown): “Another drawback of bank financing, especially valid for our sample of US firms, is that banks might be forced to terminate projects early due to the legal prudential reserve requirements (Stulz, 2001).”
Refinancing Risk and Cash Holdings (2013, unknown): “Given that shorter maturity debt subjects managers to frequent monitoring by capital market participants, the interests of managers in firms with shorter maturity debt should be more aligned with those of shareholders (e.g., Rajan and Winton (1995), Stulz (2000), Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2004)).”
Industry Growth and Capital Allocation: Does Having a Market- or Bank-Based System Matter? (2002, background): “…Boot and Thakor (1997), Gerschenkron (1962), Goldsmith (1969), La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer (2001), Levine (1997), Stiglitz (1985), and Stulz (2000) for analyses and more references regarding the relative merits of bank- and market-based financial systems in fostering economic…”
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Debt Maturity (2016, unknown): “2 unrealistic optimism (Weinstein (1980)).”