Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems

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Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods (2007, methodology): “…the most common technique used to incorporate private and public goods into a single model is the hybrid approach of adding a distributive (or side payment) component to spatial voting models (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 1988, Baron and Diermeier 2001, Crombez 1996, Jackson and Moselle 2002).”
An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures (2004, methodology): “Typically, the choice of a particular coalitional bargaining procedure in models of govern6See, e.g., Austen-Smith (2000), Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Baron (1991, 1993), Baron and Dier- meier (2001), Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Diermeier and Merlo (2000), and Merlo (1997).”
A Model of Farsighted Voting (2009, background): “The probabilistic and exogenous nature of the proposal process distinguishes this model from Baron (1996), Baron and Herron (2003), Kalandrakis (2004), Duggan and Kalandrakis (2007), Baron et al. (2007), and Riboni (2008), and warrants a short discussion.”
A Structural Model of Government Formation (2002, background): “6 See, for example, Austen-Smith and Banks (1988, 1990), Baron (1989, 1991, 1993, 1998), Baron and Diermeier (2001), Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Diermeier and Feddersen (1998), Diermeier and Merlo (2000), Laver and Shepsle (1990, 1998), and Lupia and Strom (1995).”