A Digital Signature Scheme Secure Against Adaptive Chosen-Message Attacks
By Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, R. Rivest. 1988
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Citations in the corpus
- Prio: Private, Robust, and Scalable Computation of Aggregate Statistics (2017, background): “Towards this end, we assume the existence of a publickey infrastructure and the basic cryptographic primitives (CCA-secure public-key encryption [43, 108, 109], digital signatures [71], etc.”
- On the Difficulties of Disclosure Prevention in Statistical Databases or The Case for Differential Privacy (2010, background): “Journal of Privacy and Confidentiality (2010) 2, Number 1, pp. 93–107”
- Secure Multiparty Computation for Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (2009, background): “Such authentication can be achieved using digital signatures (24) and a public-key infrastructure.”
- An Efficient Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication Scheme for Vehicular Sensor Networks Without Pairings (2016, background): “Thus, this subsection only shows that the proposed identity-based scheme is secure against an adaptive chosen message attack under a random oracle [37]–[40].”
- A New Forward-Secure Digital Signature Scheme (2000, background): “All definitions provided here are based on those given in [3], which in turn are based on those given in [12] and [5].”
- Sequential Aggregate Signatures and Multisignatures Without Random Oracles (2006, methodology): “In this case, security follows from the Computational co-Diffie-Hellman problem [9].”
- Squealing Euros: Privacy Protection in RFID-Enabled Banknotes (2003, methodology): “Our system can in principle accommodate any type of digital signature scheme secure against chosen-message attack, as defined in [19].”
- How to Break the Direct RSA-Implementation of Mixes (1990, background): “In analogy to the terminology of [14], one could call this a directed chosen ciphertext attack, directed against a particular input message.”
- Foundations of Group Signatures: Formal Definitions, Simplified Requirements, and a Construction Based on General Assumptions (2003, background): “Weassumethattheschemesatisflesthestandardnotionofunforgeabilityunder chosenmessageattack[ 20 ].Itisknownthatsuchaschemeexistsassumingonewayfunctionsexist[26],andhencecertainlyassumingtheexistenceofafamily of trapdoor permutations.”
- Identity-Based Signcryption (2002, background): “2 Unforgeability The accepted de nition of security for signature schemes is existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attack [8, 14, 17, 18].”