How to Break the Direct RSA-Implementation of Mixes

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Sphinx: A Compact and Provably Secure Mix Format (2009, methodology): “scheme by Chaum [7] was shown to have cryptographic weaknesses by Pfitzmann and Pfitzmann [18]”
Breaking Efficient Anonymous Channel (1994, background): “Historically, active attacks on mix-nets were first considered in [9]; in particular, the direct implementation of the mix-net as described in [8] with RSA as the cryptosystem was broken there.”
Mixminion: design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol (2003, background): “Pfitzmann fixed a weakness in Chaum’s original scheme based on the properties of raw RSA encryption [32].”
A Verifiable Secret Shuffle of Homomorphic Encryptions (2003, background): “Subsequent papers on mix-nets [6,15,22,28–31,42,46,48,52] have tried in many ways to guarantee correctness of a shuffle, most of which have been partially or fully broken [3,39,49,53].”
Traffic Analysis: Protocols, Attacks, Design Issues, and Open Problems (2000, background): “(7)for an attack on an RSA based implementation of a mix see [35].”
Five Practical Attacks for "Optimistic Mixing for Exit-Polls" (2003, background): “Pfitzmann has given some general attacks on mix-nets [24, 23], and Michels and Horster give additional attacks in [17].”