Sequential Aggregate Signatures and Multisignatures Without Random Oracles

By Steve Lu, Rafail M. Ostrovsky, Amit Sahai, Hovav Shacham, Brent Waters. International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, 2006

355 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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Securing Fog Computing for Internet of Things Applications: Challenges and Solutions (2018, background): “Consequently, multi-signature [160], sequential aggregate signature [161] and key-homomorphic signature [162] were introduced to aggregate n signatures on a same message from n distinct users.”
Compact Multi-Signatures for Smaller Blockchains (2018, background): “– Require every user to prove knowledge or possession of the corresponding secret key [10, 32, 47].”
Multi-signatures in the plain public-Key model and a general forking lemma (2006, methodology): “…above does not require the adversary to ﬁx the public keys of all signers in the system at the beginning of the game (as is required by the notions of [31, 11]), or to submit the secret keys of all corrupt signers to a special certiﬁcation oracle (as is required by the notions of [11, 29]).”
Short Randomizable Signatures (2016, background): “[36] where users must prove knowledge of their signing key sk when they want to add a public key pk in KeyList.”
Simple Schnorr multi-signatures with applications to Bitcoin (2019, background): “While many of these schemes have been proven secure [13,27], they rely on mechanisms that are usually not implemented by certification authorities [9,43].”