Consciousness and the varieties of emotion experience: a theoretical framework.

By J. Lambie, A. Marcel. Psychology Review, 2002

619 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Data reviewed suggest that previous theories of emotion experience are too narrow in scope and that lack of consensus is due to the fact that emotion experience takes various forms and is heterogenous. The authors treat separately the content of emotion experience, the underlying nonconscious correspondences, and processes producing emotion experience. They classify the nature and content of emotion experience and propose that it depends on 3 aspects of attention: mode (analytic-synthetic; detached-immersed), direction (self-world), and focus (evaluation-action). The account is informed by a 2-level view of consciousness in which phenomenology (1st order) is distinguished from awareness (2nd order). These distinctions enable the authors to differentiate and account for cases of "unconscious" emotion, in which there is an apparent lack of phenomenology or awareness.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e9e1f2185f352051cba334b7a919edcee703bb66

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Citations in the corpus

Happiness in the Face of Adversity: Reformulating the Dynamic and Modular Bases of Subjective Well-Being (2005, background): “Probably yes, because aware- ness varies in terms of level of reflexiveness (Lambie & Marcel, 2002).”
Language and Metalanguage: Key Issues in Emotion Research (2009, background): “And yet it is this experience, not physiological activation or neural events, which is the foundation of human connectedness and empathy—that empathy which is “one of the bases of social intersubjectivity, value systems, and morality” (Hoffman, 1982; Lambie & Marcel, 2002, p. 220).”
Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience (2005, background): “Lambie and Marcel (2002) have distinguished two levels of emotion appraisal; a first-order phenomenal state, what they call " First-order emotion experience " , and conscious second-order awareness.”
Toward a Phenomenology of Mindfulness: Subjective Experience and Emotional Correlates (2009, methodology): “Langer, 2002). In this conceptual mode or attitude, similar to what has been called second-order processing ( Lambie & Marcel, 2002 ) and propositional processing (Teasdale, 1999), our reality takes mental representational form; that is, our experience becomes what we conceptualize it to be.”
Emotion Experience and its Varieties (2009, background): “Awareness and direction of attention drastically alter what emotion experience is like (Lambie, 2009; Lambie & Marcel, 2002).”
Understanding the Processes that Regulate Positive Emotional Experience: Unsolved Problems and Future Directions for Theory and Research on Savoring (2011, background): “…in terms of whether they primarily involve cognitive reflection, in which one introspects about one’s subjective experience, or experiential absorption, in which one minimizes introspection in favor of perceptual engrossment (see Lambie & Marcel, 2002). www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 109”
The experience of emotion. (2007, background): “…ways to infer a mental representation of emotion, such as observing a person’s face or body, may be adequate at times (cf. Frith et al. 1999, Lambie & Marcel 2002), but they generally do not capture the full content of experience (Barrett 2006a, Ortony & Turner 1990, Russell,…”
The application of physiological observation methods to emotion research (2007, background): “Lambie and Marcel (2002) made this argument when they stated that first-order emotional experience could be measured by observing expressive behaviour (following the principle that what an emotion feels like can be determined by how a person behaves).”
Emotional information processing in repressors: The vigilance–avoidance theory (2007, background): “The vigilance avoidance theory owes its origins, in part, to the theoretical contributions of Lambie and Marcel (2002) and Hock, Krohne, and Kaiser (1996).”
Affective Neuroscience: Past, Present, and Future (2009, background): “The conscious experience of emotion is clearly a crucial feature and has been the focus of recent influential theoretical papers (Barrett, 2006b; Dalgleish & Power, 2004; Lambie & Marcel, 2002; Panksepp, 2005).”
Emotion and vantage point in autobiographical (2006, background): “are reflexive, that is, the self (not the world) is appraised and the self (not the world) is the object of a certain action attitude, according to Lambie and Marcel (2002). For example, in shame, the self has failed to meet a certain concern and the self, rather than the world, is the object of an ”
Mindfulness: Theoretical Foundations and Evidence for its Salutary Effects (2007, background): “For example, in an extensive review of research on these modes, Lambie and Marcel ( 2002 ; see also Marcel, 2003 ) use the terms first-order phenomenal experience and second-order awareness to refer to experiential and reflexive consciousness, respectively.”
The neurobiology of positive emotions. (2006, background): “…primitive emotional concepts of positive and negative affect (PA and NA, respectively), which are increasingly central to modern psychological analyses of emotional experiences (Lambie and Marcel, 2002; Russell, 2003), are rather general and non-specific ways to conceptualize emotional feelings.”