The Causes and Consequences of IMF Conditionality
By Axel Dreher, R. Vaubel. 2004
134 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e9d3a81c7e4afc51ff10c7c00842b85a64c08e3c
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Development
- R. Stone
- Jeffrey M. Chwieroth
- J. Vreeland
- Axel Dreher
- M. Steinwand
- Mark Copelovitch
- J. Frieden
- Stefanie Walter
In Economics and Econometrics
- R. Stone
- J. Vreeland
- Axel Dreher
- Mark Copelovitch
- M. Steinwand
- Jeffrey M. Chwieroth
- Stefanie Walter
- J. Frieden
Citations in the corpus
- THE IMF: A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF ITS ROLE AND OPERATIONS (2007, unknown): “Dreher and Vaubel (2004b) undertake a panel data analysis of 206 letters of intent between 1997 and 2003 and find that the number of conditions depends negatively on international reserves and positively on world interest rates; a finding that could be viewed as consistent with this explanation.”
- IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies (2006, background): “Dreher and Vaubel (2004), for example, look at fiscal and monetary policies.”
- IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality (2005, background): “For a detailed representation of the underlying formula, see Goldstein and Montiel (1986) or Atoyan and Conway (2005).”
- “The silent revolution:” How the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending (2012, background): “If staff judgments do not derive from formal criteria alone, how then are they formed? Public choice scholarship suggests the IMF staff face bureaucratic incentives to engage in rent-seeking behavior to maximize their power, autonomy, and budgets (Vaubel 1996; Dreher and Vaubel 2004).”
- The Scope of IMF Conditionality (2008, methodology): “…elicit voluntary participation+ Institutions are useful in order to coordinate expectations, define rules, and facilitate collec- 8+ See Vaubel 1986; Dreher and Vaubel 2004; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; and Vreeland 2003+ Starting from a different methodological point of view, Barnett and…”
- The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence (2008, background): “Dreher (2004), Dreher and Vaubel (2004b), and Ivanova et al. (2003) investigate the number of conditions the IMF imposes, while Stone (2008) analyzes the breadth of conditionality.”
- The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis (2016, background): “…crisis are treated equally and political factors – notably, the interests of the Fund’s large shareholders and the incentives of the IMF’s professional bureaucrats – play an important role in this context (e.g. Copelovitch, 2010a, 2010b; Dreher et al., 2009; Dreher & Vaubel, 2004; Thacker, 1999).”