Voting with Their Feet or Activism? Institutional Investors’ Impact on CEO Turnover

By Jean Helwege, Vincent J. Intintoli, Andrew Zhang. 2012

143 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/13ac138ad6ab4682ba6b32a51e62dc6647f9aa86

Citations in the corpus

• Hometown advantage: The effects of monitoring institution location on financial reporting discretion (2011, unknown): “For example, Helwege et al. (2010) find that activism (e.g., initiation of proxy contest, public criticism of anti-takeover amendments, etc.) by blockholder institutions is positively related to forced CEO turnover. In another study, Becht et al. (2010) find that private negotiations with firms by a”
• Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research (2017, unknown): “Author(s) Time period of events covered Data source(s) Type(s) of activism Sponsor(s) Nelson (2006b) 1990-2003 CalPERS Focus List, Wall Street Journal NS CalPERS Nesbitt (1994) 1992-1993 CalPERS SP CalPERS Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015) 1994-2007 PREC14A, PREN14A, PRRN14A, DEFC14A, DEFN14A,”
• Institutional Investor Stability and Crash Risk: Monitoring versus Short-Termism? (2013, unknown): “3 See Jarrell and Poulsen (1987), Brickley et al. (1988), Agrawal and Mandelker (1990, 1992), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Bushee (1998), Wahal and McConnell (2000), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Parrino et al. (2003), Ajinkya et al. (2005), Bushee et al. (2008), Janakiraman et al. (2010), Aggarwal e”