Phenomenal consciousness: A naturalistic theory

By T. M. Pearce. 2003

199 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge (2014, background): “…that the mindreading system possesses the concepts of sight, hearing, and so forth (together with a concept of self) and it is able to activate and deploy these concepts precisely in the presence of the appropriate sort of perceptual input via a recognitional mechanism (see also Carruthers, 2000).”
Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2007, background): “28 Type-E dualists include Huxley (1874), Campbell (1970), Jackson (1982), and Robinson (1988).”
The Phenomenal Self (2008, background): “And even if there were, it is implausible in the extreme to hold that the phenomenal bonds between our experiences are constituted by a higher-order state that is itself entirely unconscious for the most part! This applies equally to those versions of the higher-order theory which appeal to potentia”
The illusion of conscious will (2007, background): “But he has a number of different illusions in mind at different points in his discussion, not all of which, arguably, really constitute an attack on conscious willing.”
The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality (2002, unknown): “For instance, Dretske (1995), Tye (1995, 1999), Lycan (1996), and Carruthers (2000).”
The Representational Character of Experience (2004, background): “I think that the insights of 1 See Rosenthal 1997, Carruthers 2000, Tye 1995, and Dretske 1995.”