The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality
By T. Horgan, John Tienson. 2002
478 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b90977cca0ceb0cd3435907d4c8fff430ef6e821
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Charles Siewert
- Susanna Schellenberg
- David J. Chalmers
- Dustin Stokes
- Michael Rescorla
- Silvia Coradeschi
- Alessandro Saffiotti
- T. Horgan
Citations in the corpus
- The Representational Character of Experience (2004, background): “More generally, Horgan and Tienson (2002) have argued that the existence of 12 Versions of narrow representationalism are advocated by Rey 1998, Kriegel 2002b, and Levine 2003. rich narrow content is a consequence of the plausible view that phenomenal duplicates share rich representational content.”
- An introduction to the anchoring problem (2003, background): “Santos and Shanahan [37] discuss anchoring as the “process of assigning abstract symbols to real sensor data” and develop a theory whose “universe of discourse includes sorts for time points, depth, size, peaks, physical bodies and viewpoints.”
- Is Experience Transparent? (2004, background): “For other views I would classify as non-reductive intentionalism, see Crane (2002) and Horgan and Tienson (2002) .”
- Cognitive Penetrability of Perception (2013, background): “See Horgan and Tienson 2002; Loar 2003; Strawson 1994.”
- Bayesian Perceptual Psychology (2015, background): “I will now illustrate by considering phenomenal content, as postulated by Chalmers (2006), Horgan and Tienson (2002), Thompson (2010), and various other philosophers.”
- Phenomenal epistemology: What is consciousness that we may know it so well? (2007, background): “See, for instance, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Horgan, Tienson, and Graham 2006, Kriegel 2003b.”
- The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience (2010, background): “In contrast, the notion of phenomenological particularity picks out what is sometimes referred to as the intentional directedness (e.g. Horgan and Tienson 2002) or as the direct presentational phenomenology of an experience (e.g. Chalmers 2006a).”