The Representational Character of Experience
By David J. Chalmers. 2004
405 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/89bcfed7dce4a640f0ca5d747e2891e08b9411d9
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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
In Philosophy
Citations in the corpus
- Is Experience Transparent? (2004, background): “For a detailed discussion of different “intentionalisms” about consciousness, reductive and non-reductive, see Chalmers (2004) .”
- Why explain visual experience in terms of content (2010, background): “For the property of having some property that plays the red-role, see Chalmers (2004).”
- Attention and perceptual content (2010, background): “(Chalmers 2004: 161 – note that Chalmers considers this example Analysis Vol 0 | Number 0 | 2010 | pp. 1–7 doi:10.1093/analys/anp165 The Author 2009.”
- ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT (2010, background): “David Chalmers ( 2004 ) notes that if one shifts attention back and forth between two pinpoint red lights , one ' s phenomenology changes .”
- The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience (2013, neutral): “ Self-‐representational contents of various sorts are defended by Searle (1983), Chalmers (2004), Kriegel (2009), Siegel (2006).”