Address Space Layout Permutation (ASLP): Towards Fine-Grained Randomization of Commodity Software

By Chongkyung Kil, J. Jun, Christopher Bookholt, Jun Xu, Peng Ning. Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference, 2006

327 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e91c941f3b362def6acd4444ceeeb696cd97e7f4

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Citations in the corpus

Jump over ASLR: Attacking branch predictors to bypass ASLR (2016, background): “These schemes enforce the enhanced randomization at different levels, such as at the level of functions [31], basic blocks [48] or instructions [49], [50].”
Just-In-Time Code Reuse: On the Effectiveness of Fine-Grained Address Space Layout Randomization (2013, methodology): “[29] show how the Linux kernel can be instrumented to increase the entropy in the base address randomization of shared libraries, and discuss how re-randomization can be performed on each run of an application.”
Smashing the Gadgets: Hindering Return-Oriented Programming Using In-place Code Randomization (2012, background): “Attackers are able to a priori pick the right code pieces because parts of the code image of the vulnerable application remain static across different installations.”
FLUSH+RELOAD: A High Resolution, Low Noise, L3 Cache Side-Channel Attack (2014, unknown): “More specifically, in virtualised environments, static reordering of code and data [12,24,36] can be used to create unique copies of programs in each virtual machines.”
SoK: Eternal War in Memory (2013, background): “To increase the entropy in code locations, researchers proposed the permutation of functions [44] and instructions inside functions [45] as well.”
ILR: Where'd My Gadgets Go? (2012, background): “permute function locations to randomize gadget locations, but require additional compiletime information [36].”
ROP is Still Dangerous: Breaking Modern Defenses (2014, methodology): “Address Space Layout Permutation (ASLP) [16] is similar in many ways to ASLR but provides higher entropy by permuting the locations of functions.”
SoK: Automated Software Diversity (2014, unknown): “’06 [38] Link SPEC CPU 2000 0% N/A C/C++ LMBench 3.”
Code-pointer integrity (2014, methodology): “Randomization ASLR [40], ASLP [26] PointGuard [13] DSR [6] NOP insertion [21] No Bound).”
Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical (2017, background): “These attacks motivated further development of more fine-grained memory randomization forms, which randomize application binaries at granularity of functions [37], basic blocks12 [73, 15] and even single instructions [53, 25].”
SGXBOUNDS: Memory Safety for Shielded Execution (2017, unknown): “Also note that Address Space Randomization (ASR) and its fine-grained variants [31, 34, 41, 50] do not have sufficient bit entropy in SGX en- claves (recall that SGX restricts enclave address space to only 36 bits) and thus can be easily broken [70, 72].”
Toward Proactive, Adaptive Defense: A Survey on Moving Target Defense (2019, methodology): “Common memory protection techniques, such as Address Space-Layout Randomization (ASLR) [144], and Address Space Layout Permutation (ASLP) [98], are proposed”
The Cybersecurity Landscape in Industrial Control Systems (2016, background): “To tackle this limitation, a number of fine-grained ASLR schemes have been proposed [115]– [120].”
Code injection attacks on harvard-architecture devices (2008, unknown): “[16] proposes to improve ASLR by randomising the binary code itself.”