Code-pointer integrity

By Volodymyr Kuznetsov, László Szekeres, Mathias Payer, George Candea, R. Sekar, Dawn Song. USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, 2014

561 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming: On the Difficulty of Preventing Code Reuse Attacks in C++ Applications (2015, methodology): “This changed through the broad deployment of the well-known data execution prevention (DEP) countermeasure [33] that renders immediate code injection attacks infeasible.”
Data-Oriented Programming: On the Expressiveness of Non-control Data Attacks (2016, background): “Examples of these include control-ﬂow integrity (CFI) [6]–[11], protection of code pointers (CCFI, CPI) [12], [13], timely-randomization of code pointers (TASR) [14], memory randomization [15], and write-xor-execute (W ⊕ X, or data-execution prevention, DEP) [16].”
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX (2015, background): “Our invariants share some properties with recent proposals for efficient execution integrity, such as CPI [34] and WIT [2], but our invariants and enforcement mechanisms are adapted to the enclave environment.”
C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software (2016, background): “Keywords remote attestation; control-flow attacks; embedded system security”