ILR: Where'd My Gadgets Go?

By Jason Hiser, Anh Nguyen-Tuong, Michele Co, Matthew Hall, Jack W. Davidson. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2012

319 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c8e32c9fbcd3941e7fa445fac312c3397b48ee49

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Citations in the corpus

SoK: Automated Software Diversity (2014, methodology): “Instruction location randomization (ILR) rewrites binaries to use a new program encoding [29].”
ROPecker: A Generic and Practical Approach For Defending Against ROP Attacks (2014, background): “Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1973 This Conference Proceeding Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University.”
Binary stirring: self-randomizing instruction addresses of legacy x86 binary code (2012, methodology): “Most recently, IPR [44] and ILR [29] have been proposed to alleviate the problem of ROP attacks.”
Just-In-Time Code Reuse: On the Effectiveness of Fine-Grained Address Space Layout Randomization (2013, methodology): “To address this limitation, several proposals have emerged [23, 45, 62].”
The Cybersecurity Landscape in Industrial Control Systems (2016, unknown): “[116] J.”
SGX-Shield: Enabling Address Space Layout Randomization for SGX Programs (2017, methodology): “many fine-grained ASLR techniques [13, 23, 24, 32, 45, 59] claim that randomizing the code in various fine-grained units (e.”
Control Flow Integrity for COTS Binaries (2013, background): “Rather than eliminating gadgets, some recent works [18, 43, 33] rely on fine-grained randomization that makes it difficult to find the location of useful gadgets.”
Hacking Blind (2014, background): “Additional techniques exist to try to randomize gadget locations on a per instance run, but these offer no defense against BROP unless the binary is fully restarted (fork and exec) [25], [26].”
Practical Control Flow Integrity and Randomization for Binary Executables (2013, methodology): “Many other approaches [16][17][18] have depended heavily on heuristics which with unjustified assumptions that miss some fraction of code.”
ROP is Still Dangerous: Breaking Modern Defenses (2014, background): “Other defenses extends this further by randomizing the addresses of individual instructions [15, 31].”
Out of Control: Overcoming Control-Flow Integrity (2014, background): “As a result, many proposals where introduced for fine grained randomization in executables by applying in-place randomization [39], breaking the linearity of the address-space [40], or shuffling the basic code blocks of a program [41].”
Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical (2017, background): “These attacks motivated further development of more fine-grained memory randomization forms, which randomize application binaries at granularity of functions [37], basic blocks12 [73, 15] and even single instructions [53, 25].”