Information acquisition in auctions

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Decision Theoretic Approaches to Experiment Design and External Validity (2016, neutral): “Clearly, experimentation and learning have been widely studied by economic theorists (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Milgrom, 1981; Banerjee, 1992; Persico, 2000; Bergemann and Välimäki, 2002).”
Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values (2000, neutral): “Persico (1999) considers a model with costly information acquisition and shows that the auction institution itself may affect the level of information accumulation.”
Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing (2017, background): “Persico (2000) shows that if the buyers’signals are affi liated then they acquire more information in a first-price auction than in a second-price one.”
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions (2006, background): “See Milgrom [30] and subsequent papers on information acquisition in auction, which include Bergemann and Välimäki [6], Matthews [27], Persico [35], and Tan [40].”
Information structures in optimal auctions (2007, background): “Persico (2000) compares the equilibrium incentives of the bidders to acquire information in first and second price auctions within a model of affiliated values.”
Student Portfolios and the College Admissions Problem (2014, background): “Specifically, for the earlier location-scale family, ψ(α1) rises in the signal accuracy 1/μ (see Persico (2000)).”