THEORIES OF DELEGATION

By Jonathan Bendor, A. Glazer, Thomas H. Hammond. 2003

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The Next Generation of Research on IS Use: A Theoretical Framework of Delegation to and from Agentic IS Artifacts (2021, background): “We bound our theorizing to relationships between human agents and agentic IS artifacts when the IS artifact possesses at least some degree of autonomy relevant to task completion and goal attainment (Bendor et al. 2001; Castelfranchi and Falcone 1998; Wooldridge 2009).”
Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China (2018, background): “…principal–agent problem.4 A key insight from this literature is that a cooperative equilibrium is more likely to emerge if the principals and agents share similar interests and preferences—a result often known as the “ally principle” (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).”
Introduction [The Handbook of Organizational Economics] (2012, unknown): “See also Bendor et al. (2001).”
Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule‐Making in the Public Interest (2005, unknown): “The delegation of policymaking authority to regulatory agencies has been a central focus of the principal-agent literature (for a recent review, see Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001), but few scholars have provided thorough analyses of the post-delegation operation of such regulators (for…”
Spatial Models of Delegation (2004, background): “See A′′ for details.)”