최고경영자의 임금(CEO Compensation)

By 정동관. 2013

291 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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CFOs versus CEOs: Equity Incentives and Crashes (2011, unknown): “Fuller and Jensen (2010) argue that 12 increasing the proportion of stock options in executive compensation makes the preservation and enhancement of short-term stock price a personal priority for both CEOs and CFOs.”
Playing It Safe? Managerial Preferences, Risk, and Agency Conflicts (2016, unknown): “But, interestingly, the decrease in risk taking has coincided with increases in equity-based compensation (Frydman and Jenter, 2010) and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to corporate performance (Jenter and Lewellen, 2014), both of which give corporate leaders incentives to tread carefully.”
Behavioral Agency Theory (2015, background): “More recently, Frydman and Jenter (2010) have argued, based on a review of U.S. executive compensation data covering the period 1936 to 2005, that neither optimal contracting (agency theory) nor the managerial power hypothesis is fully consistent with the available evidence.”
Firm performance, corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan (2018, background): “Countless studies report that firm size is positively related to executive compensation (e.g. Devers et al. 2007; Frydman and Jenter 2010).”