A Tiebout/tax-competition model

By Jan K. Brueckner. 2000

128 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e560a83047640b00507ddc56e3b96059da7df792

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Michael P. Devereux
2. Michela Redoano
3. Koleman Strumpf
4. Paul W. Rhode
5. Richard E. Romano
6. Dennis Epple
7. Ben Lockwood
8. Jan K. Brueckner

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Michael P. Devereux
2. Dennis Epple
3. Richard E. Romano
4. Jan K. Brueckner
5. Michela Redoano
6. Ben Lockwood
7. Paul W. Rhode
8. Koleman Strumpf

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Michael P. Devereux
2. Jan K. Brueckner
3. Ben Lockwood
4. Michela Redoano
5. Koleman Strumpf
6. Paul W. Rhode
7. Richard E. Romano
8. Dennis Epple

Citations in the corpus

• Tax competition among local governments: Evidence from a property tax reform in Finland (2012, unknown): “Drawing on Brueckner (2000), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) combine heterogeneous preferences and locally fi xed tax base and show that in a model with two jurisdictions competing for a fi xed amount of capital, the relationship between capital tax rates in the jurisdictions may be positive or…”
• Do Countries Compete over Corporate Tax Rates (2008, background): “far as we are aware) all empirical work on tax competition estimates one or the other on a given data-set, with most studies working with the contemporaneous speci…cation24 (Brueckner, 2000).”
• Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990 (2003, background): “To place a three-minute transcontinental call in January 1915 (when service first became available) cost $20.70 in current dollars, which was almost $314 in 1998 dollars.”
• Neighborhood Schools, Choice, and the Distribution of Educational Benefits (2000, background): “The model can be varied to examine property taxation, with results that are qualitatively the same.”
• Benefit Corporation Legislation and the Emergence of a Social Hybrid Category (2015, background): “complement tax-funded government actions.(25) Thus, states that tend to provide more services (higher overall taxes) but rely less on business (lower corporate taxes) to pay for these services are more likely to favor a new social hybrid legal category.”
• Fiscal Decentralization with Distortionary Taxation: Tiebout vs. Tax Competition (2004, methodology): “7 As shown by Brueckner (2000), the resulting equilibrium has some striking features not found in tax-competition models with homogeneous consumers.”
• Partial fiscal decentralization (2009, background): “Since public-good demand falls with index of the consumer, it follows that T1⁎NT2⁎N⋯NTm⁎.9 8 See Brueckner (2000) for a diagram of this type based on a somewhat different model.”