Fiscal Decentralization with Distortionary Taxation: Tiebout vs. Tax Competition

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On the Endogenous Allocation of Decision Powers in Federal Structures (2005, unknown): “The benefits and costs are also analyzed in Brueckner [8] who contrasts benefits à la Tiebout with the negative effects of tax competition.”
Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism (2005, background): “Brueckner (2004) provides some numerical simulations that explore the tradeoff between the inefficiencies in local taxation and the gains from local provision under Tiebout sorting.”
Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth (2006, background): “…1972, Alesina and Spoalore, 1997), losses from interjurisdictional tax competition when government revenue comes from taxation of a mobile tax base (Brueckner, 2004), and failure to properly account for public-good spillovers across jurisdictions (Oates, 1972, and Besley and Coate, 2003).1 A…”
Partial fiscal decentralization (2009, background): “Recent papers include Lockwood (2002), Besley and Coate (2003), Brueckner (2004) and Lorz and Willman (2005), among others (see Brueckner (2004) for fuller references).”
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: SPENDING VERSUS REVENUE DECENTRALIZATION (2013, methodology): “…may lead local governments to engage in a “race to the bottom” on the taxation of mobile factors, hence under-providing productive public expenditure (Brueckner 2004), or increase corruption because officials at the local level are more susceptible to the demands of local interest groups…”