Sec Scrutiny and the Evolution of Non-Gaap Reporting

By Kalin S. Kolev, Carol A. Marquardt, Sarah E. McVay. 2008

267 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3f26b6c114899e9f678df40631c016073c8f9c34

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Benjamin C. Whipple
2. Martin Walker
3. Theodore E. Christensen
4. Mark T. Soliman
5. Kurt H. Gee
6. Mark Bradshaw
7. Jeffrey T. Doyle
8. Jared N. Jennings

In Finance

1. Martin Walker
2. Mark T. Soliman
3. Benjamin C. Whipple
4. Kurt H. Gee
5. Jared N. Jennings
6. Jeffrey T. Doyle
7. Mark Bradshaw
8. Theodore E. Christensen

In Strategy and Management

1. Benjamin C. Whipple
2. Theodore E. Christensen
3. Mark T. Soliman
4. Kurt H. Gee
5. Martin Walker
6. Mark Bradshaw
7. Jared N. Jennings
8. Jeffrey T. Doyle

Citations in the corpus

• Analysts’ GAAP earnings forecasts and their implications for accounting research (2018, background): “21 Prior research finds evidence consistent with managers using income-shifting to meet analysts’ forecasts (McVay, 2006) and with non-GAAP reporting firms shifting recurring expenses into transitory items in more recent years (Kolev et al., 2008).”
• Non-GAAP earnings and board independence (2011, unknown): “…preceding the middle of 2001, following Kolev et al. (2008); the post-scrutiny period is the remaining quarters.27 The main effect of non-GAAP exclusions falls from -1.08 to -0.75, consistent with Kolev et al. (2008), who find that the quality of exclusions improves following the SEC scrutiny.”
• Why do pro forma and Street earnings not reflect changes in GAAP? Evidence from SFAS 123R (2012, unknown): “(3) and (5), permitting EARNt and COMPXA, or DEARNt and DCOMPXAt, to have different coefficients; and (5) using, sequentially, operating earnings from Compusat (Kolev et al. 2008) and cash from operations instead of GAAP earnings.”
• How far can we trust earnings numbers? What research tells us about earnings management (2013, background): “Kolev et al. (2008) find that the quality of exclusions are higher in the post-intervention period, and that the firms that stopped producing non-GAAP earning were the ones that made more dubious exclusions in the pre-intervention period.”
• The Disclosure of Non-GAAP Earnings Information in the Presence of Transitory Gains (2014, unknown): “It is important to note, however, that these components include income-decreasing special items, and there is prior evidence that managers shift recurring expenses to transitory expenses (McVay 2006; Kolev et al. 2008).”
• Do Managers Define Non-GAAP Earnings to Meet or Beat Analyst Forecasts? (2013, background): “34 For more information on Regulation G see Kolev et al. (2008). 35 They do report that “pre-regulation GAAP disclosers” do not experience a similar drop in meeting or beating after Regulation G, but they do not test the two groups against each other or specifically determine if they use non-GAAP or”