Oil Rents, Corruption, and State Stability: Evidence from Panel Data Regressions

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Globalisation, governance, accountability and the natural resource ‘curse’: Implications for socio-economic growth of oil-rich developing countries (2019, background): “Furthermore, Arezki and Brückner (2011) use a panel of 30 oil-exporting countries from 1992 to 2005 to investigate oil rents effect on corruption and state stability based on the exogenous factors within-country variation to determine resource-curse.”
The evolution of the natural resource curse thesis: A critical literature survey (2017, background): “Arezki and Brückner (2011) examine the effect of oil rent on corruption and state stability for a panel of 31 oil-exporting countries between 1992 and 2005.”
Equity, climate justice and fossil fuel extraction: principles for a managed phase out (2020, background): “The beneficiaries of extraction are often distant from those adversely affected, a problem made worse by the prevalence of corruption in relation to extraction (Andersen et al. 2017; Arezki and Bruckner 2011).”
Natural Resources and Economic Development: New Panel Evidence (2015, background): “2005; Ding and Field 2005; Arezki and Ploeg 2011) and provides evidence that the curse primarily operates by undermining the quality of a country’s governing institutions, thereby increasing the incidence of corruption, waste, mismanagement, and even social conflict (Ross 2001, 2006; Bulte et al. 20”