Analyst Coverage and Earnings Management

By F. Yu. 2008

1,653 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e4a76364c206790c7c5fa00032633fb97fcbdefa

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm-Level Analysis (2011, neutral): “For example, Yu (2008) finds that firms with high analyst coverage engage less in opportunistic earnings management, a finding consistent with the monitoring role of analysts.”
Mandatory IFRS adoption: the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management (2017, background): “Yu (2008) shows that the greater the coverage by analysts, the lower is the level of discretionary accruals.”
Does the External Monitoring Effect of Financial Analysts Deter Corporate Fraud in China? (2014, background): “Analysts are considered to be sophisticated users of financial statement information, with an industry background, experience in tracking the firm they follow, active engagement with managers to acquire information, and the expertise to detect abnormal changes in operating performance (Yu 2008).”
Transparency, Liquidity, and Valuation: International Evidence on When Transparency Matters Most (2012, neutral): “22 We do not include FUND_SMTHC as a transparency measure since it is unclear whether it reflects transparency or some other component of operating or business risk (Liu and Wysocki (2008)).”
Ownership Structure and Earnings Management in Malaysian Listed Companies: The Size Effect (2008, background): “Yu (2008) suggests that more analyst coverage leads to less earnings management.”
Product market power, industry structure, and corporate earnings management (2013, background): “In a related vein, Balakrishnan and Cohen (2011) find a negative relation between institutional holdings and the frequency of earnings restatements while Yu (2008) documents a similar relationship between analyst coverage and accruals.”
Corporate Governance, Accounting and Finance: A Review (2011, positive): “Firms with a greater analyst following are associated with less earnings management, perhaps because of their visibility (Yu, 2008).”
Does Information Asymmetry Affect Corporate Tax Aggressiveness? (2017, methodology): “We calculate the excessive analyst coverage by the residuals from a regression of analyst coverage on firm size, lagged ROA, asset growth, external financing activities, cash flow volatility, and year dummies (Yu (2008)).”
Are All Analysts Created Equal? Industry Expertise and Monitoring Effectiveness of Financial Analysts (2017, positive): “Consistent with their supposition, recent research (e.g., Yu (2008), Irani and Oesch (2013), Chen, Harford, and Lin (2013)) has produced a growing body of evidence suggesting that analyst coverage can improve corporate governance, managerial incentives, and firm decision making.”
Transparency, Liquidity, and Valuation: International Evidence (2009, neutral): “In our two-stage least squares analysis (untabulated), we build on Roulstone (2003) and Yu (2008) and estimate a first-stage model which features transparency (TRANS) as a function of two sets of variables: potentially endogenous variables present in the Table 3 liquidity regression (LNMVE, BM,…”
Recognition versus Disclosure of Fair Values (2015, methodology): “…previous discussion on Pre_IFRS_FV, we argue that EPRA_Index is an appropriate instrument as it (i) is plausibly exogenous to investor information demand (Yu 2008); (ii) significantly explains Ext; and (iii) can be validly excluded from the second-stage regressions (Equations (3) and (4) below).”