Transparency, Liquidity, and Valuation: International Evidence
By Mark H. Lang, K. Lins, Mark Maffett. 2009
561 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/057f10602ed550b5ef8f706536e1672cdb8fdea5
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Christian Leuz
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Hans B. Christensen
- Luzi Hail
- Mark Maffett
- Xiangang Xin
- Mikhail Pevzner
- Zhe An
Citations in the corpus
- Independent Director Reputation Incentives and Stock Price Informativeness (2017, unknown): “Our paper therefore adds to the literature on corporate transparency (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Lang et al., 2012; Bushman et al., 2004) and more specifically to the literature on transparency and corporate governance (Chen et al., 2015; Armstrong et al., 2012; Ferreira and Laux, 2007).”
- Earnings Management, Capital Structure and the Role of Institutional Environments (2016, background): “For example, we control for market-to-book ratio as it, as a proxy for growth opportunity, may affect both 9See a similar argument by Lang et al. (2012).”
- Managerial Ability and Income Smoothing (2019, unknown): “…that degrees of income smoothing are determined not only by managerial discretion but also by the firm’s fundamental characteristics (e.g., operating environment and business strategy), 25 we follow Lang et al. (2012) and decompose smoothing into its fundamental and discretionary components.”
- Home Country Tax System Characteristics and Corporate Tax Avoidance: International Evidence (2012, unknown): “…conformity were increased in the U.S. Prior research suggests the amount of flexibility that firms have to report differences between taxable income and pre-tax earnings per the financial statements differs across countries (Ali and Hwang 2000; Hung 2001; Atwood et al. 2010; Lang et al. 2011).”
- When Firms Talk, Do Investors Listen? The Role of Trust in Stock Market Reactions to Corporate Earnings Announcements (2012, result): “Consistent with prior studies such as DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant (2007), Landsman, Maydew, and Thornock (2012) and Lang, Lins, and Maffett (2012), standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm level clustering (Petersen (2009)).”
- Financial Reporting Opacity and Informed Trading by International Institutional Investors (2012, methodology): “…including historical point-in-time Datastream data and Compustat Global) Discretionary Smoothing the firm’s discretionary earnings smoothing, calculated following Lang et al. (2012), which constructs this measure by combining two commonly used measures of earnings management: the variability of…”
- Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation: Prior Conditions, Implementation, and Enforcement (2016, methodology): “Following Daske et al. (2008) and Lang, Lins, and Maffett (2012), we combine four individual proxies for information asymmetry and illiquidity (i.e., bid-ask spreads, price impact, zero returns, and total trading costs) by way of factor analysis to measure our construct of market liquidity.”
- What Are the Best Liquidity Proxies for Global Research (2017, unknown): “Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2009) hypothesize that a combination of overconfidence and the desire to gamble results in excess trading by individual investors.”
- Book-Tax Conformity, Earnings Persistence and the Association Between Earnings and Future Cash Flows (2010, unknown): “Lang et al. (2009) suggest that”
- The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements and Mandatory Adoption of IFRS (2012, unknown): “We include a time trend variable, TIME, which takes on the value year t less 1990, to allow for possible time trends in AVAR and AVOL, as documented in Landsman and Maydew (2002). SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured at fiscal year-end.”
- The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research (2015, background): “Many studies in this literature also document that firms’ disclosures and countries’ institutions have interactive associations with respect to market outcomes (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2005; Leuz et al., 2008; Lang et al., 2012; Maffett, 2012).”