Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions

By Joan Feigenbaum, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Scott Shenker. Journal of computer and system sciences (Print), 2001

463 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e321a44c541643916a0a820f0e2e3a08e56bbe5b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Computer Networks and Communications

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks (2004, methodology): “[10] and [11] are examples of applying DAMD to BGP routing and multicast cost sharing.”
Algorithms, games, and the internet (2001, unknown): “[22, 7], and further opportunities abound.”
Feature Selection via Coalitional Game Theory (2007, methodology): “This use of the Shapley value has received recent attention in the context of sharing the cost of multicast routing (Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, & Shenker, 2001).”
Stackelberg scheduling strategies (2001, background): “An area of research that typically does not study Nash equilibria but is nevertheless concerned with controlling selfish behavior is that of algorithmic mechanism design [13, 20, 21, 26].”
BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services (2005, background): “Game theory [25] has a long history in the economics literature [4, 28, 41] and has recently become of general interest in computer science [3, 20, 22, 23, 45, 48, 61].”
A survey on networking games in telecommunications (2006, unknown): “See, for example, [180] [181] .”
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms (2003, methodology): “27 This might point to adopting a design methodology similar to that in traditional MD, which develops solutions and mechanisms for restricted domains.”
The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation (2004, unknown): “Email: timr@cs.berkeley.edu.”
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions (2002, methodology): “One could conclude from the results in [20, 18, 47] that MC is the only strategyproof mechanism that can be practically deployed on the Internet.”
Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems (2005, methodology): “…[Fabrikant et al., 2003; Christin and Chuang, 2005], sel.sh routing [Cole et al., 2003] and interconnection [Ferreira and Sirbu, 2005], congestion control [Akella et al., 2002], multicast cost sharing [Feigenbaum et al., 2001], and sel.sh caching [Chun et al., 2004], just to name a few.”
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (2000, methodology): “The main difficulty is that agents may choose to misreport their valuations in an attempt to affect the outcome to their liking.”
Sprite: a simple, cheat-proof, credit-based system for mobile ad-hoc networks (2003, methodology): “Our approach is motivated by algorithmic mechanism design (see e.g., [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24]), which is an emerging active research area in the intersection of computer science and mathematical economics.”
Network games (2004, background): “In the talk we will focus on the network games such as routing [26, 3, 13, 17], and costsharing games for multicast [12, 18], and network design [19, 24].”