Do Non-audit Service Fees Impair Auditor Independence? Evidence from Going-concern Audit Opinions

By Mark L. Defond, K. Raghunandan, K. Subramanyam. 2002

1,311 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e26019448512a97a7971d8b4ac7fe86099604288

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Citations in the corpus

Evidence on (the lack of) audit-quality differentiation in the private client segment of the belgian audit market (2004, background): “…charge higher fees (see, for example, Simunic, 1980; Francis and Simon, 1987; Craswell et al., 1995), are more likely to issue non-clean audit opinions (see, for example, Defond et al., 2002) and constrain earnings management more than non-Big Six firms (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999).”
Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality? (2010, methodology): “Indeed, as noted by DeFond et al. (2002), the auditor’s failure to issue a going concern opinion to a client who subsequently files for bankruptcy is typically referred to as a case of audit failure.”
Determinants of Weaknesses in Internal Control over Financial Reporting (2007, neutral): “…measures: the log of the number of special purpose entities associated with the firm, SPEs, the log of the sum of the number of operating and geographic segments, SEGMENTS, and the existence of a foreign currency adjustment, FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS (e.g., DeFond et al., 2002; Bushman et al., 2004 ).”
The Incentives of Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay (2010, methodology): “The ratio we use is the same one used by Waxman (2007) and is similar in spirit to those used in the audit literature to examine auditor independence (see, for example, DeFond et al. 2002).”
Do Abnormally High Audit Fees Impair Audit Quality (2010, methodology): “…abnormal NAS fees and audit quality is in line with the findings of several previous studies (e.g., Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; DeFond et al. 2002; Ruddock et al. 2006), which fail to find a significant association between various measures of NAS fees and audit quality.21 In…”
Client importance and audit partner independence (2012, background): “Although the majority of academic papers (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; DeFond et al., 2002) fail to find any such evidence, SOX nevertheless prohibits auditors from providing most non-audit services to their audit clients due to concerns about independence.”
The Effects of Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions on Earnings Quality and Auditor Behavior (2012, neutral): “…mitigate the incentive problems arising from executive compensation: if managers understand that their fraudulent behavior will be penalized ex post through a loss in income, job, and/or reputation, they should have fewer incentives to engage in earnings manipulation ex ante (Desai et al., 2006).”