Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games

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The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring (2005, methodology): “As discussed in the introduction, the construction retains some of the features of belief-free equilibria (see Ely, Horner and Olszewski (2004) ).”
Consequentialist conditional cooperation in social dilemmas with imperfect information (2017, result): “Agents choose a policy πi : Ωi → Δ(Ai) which takes as input the observation and outputs a probability distribution on actions - this is similar to the notion of ‘belief free strategies’ in the study of repeated games (Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski 2005).”
A foundation for markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory (2013, background): “7See Piccione (2002), Ely and Välimäki (2002), and Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski (2005).”
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information (2007, unknown): “It has been introduced in another context, namely in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, in Piccione (2002) and Ely and Välimäki (2002), and further examined in Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski (2005).”