The folk theorem for games with private almost-perfect monitoring
By Johannes Hörner, Wojciech Olszewski. 2005
128 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/785f17a193719f2b0960bbb1bd075c7882de8b52
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Science and Operations Research
Citations in the corpus
- Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices* (2011, background): “(8) needs to be sufficiently small so that V − V N is sufficiently large and, therefore, (5) holds.”
- Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2004, unknown): “2005), variations on belief-free strategy profiles have been used to prove general folk theorems (Hörner and Olszewski 2005).”