Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
By Stefano Lovo, Johannes Hörner, Tristan Tomala. 2007
52 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/20408352b2bef5d432f36524a169a237d8ab0709
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Science and Operations Research
Citations in the corpus
- Efficiency in Games with Markovian Private Information (2013, background): “However, Hörner and Lovo (2009) showed that it can be used in games with perfectly persistent types, as the strategy of the uninformed player is then given by the approachability result of Blackwell (1956).”