The Association between Outside Directors, Institutional Investors and the Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts

By C. Peake. 2005

1,289 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e0c1fac3c319f6829f380deab5950ad76ad283ac

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Citations in the corpus

Industry Concentration and Corporate Disclosure Policy (2014, background): “(Ajinkya et al., 2005), and an indicator variable for the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure period”
Board structures and the establishment of a risk management committee by Malaysian listed firms (2010, neutral): “For example, previous studies have avoided the word ‘‘independence’’ by using ‘‘outside directors’’ to describe directors who are presumed to be independent from management (see for instance Hanrahan et al. 2001; Anderson et al. 2004; Ajinkya et al. 2005; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2006).”
Do Institutional Investors Demand Public Disclosure (2016, neutral): “This tradeoff is reflected in mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional ownership and corporate disclosure (Ajinkya et al. [2005], Bushee et al. [2003], Bushee and Noe [2000], Healy et al. [1999], O’Brien and Bhushan [1990]).”
Management Earnings Forecasts and Other Forward-Looking Statements (2017, positive): “Ajinkya et al. (2005) use the number and characteristics of earnings forecasts to study the effect of outside governance on voluntary disclosures.”
Guiding Through the Fog: Financial Statement Complexity and Voluntary Disclosure (2016, positive): “On the one hand, managers under a high degree of scrutiny from external monitors may have stronger incentives to mitigate the negative informational effects of complex financial statements and maintain the quality of the information environment (e.g., Ajinkya et al., 2005; Armstrong et al., 2010).”
Non-GAAP earnings and board independence (2011, neutral): “Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that managers of firms with greater institutional ownership and outside 6 We focus on the alignment of interests between shareholders and managers, but efficient organizational design would minimize contracting costs between all factors of production (e.g., Jensen and…”
Motives for disclosure and non-disclosure: a framework and review of the evidence (2006, background): “Ajinkya et al. (2005) provides evidence that managers choose to supply greater disclosure when outside directors hold board seats and when institutional investors hold large amounts of their firms’ stock.”
Audited Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure as Complements: A Test of the Confirmation Hypothesis (2012, positive): “For example, Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) conclude that governance structure (including board structure) affects firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior, and Carcello et al.”
Management Forecast Quality and Capital Investment Decisions (2014, positive): “Consistent with this intuition, prior studies, such as Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Hutton et al. (2012), document that timelines is an important determinant of forecasting accuracy.”
Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision (2013, background): “Although several studies (Baginski and Hassell 1997; Ajinkya et al. 2005) have examined the economic determinants of”