How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines
By Austan Goolsbee, Chad Syverson. 2008
515 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management, Transportation
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ddd05927159ea7ce029cd907958bbb5f14e8b53c
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Strategy and Management
In Transportation
Citations in the corpus
- The impact of high-speed rail and low-cost carriers on European air passenger traffic (2014, unknown): “…a recent study on the role of low-cost carrier entry examines how incumbents respond prior, during, and after the entry of Southwest Airlines, demonstrating that even the threat of entry has an impact on air transportation capacity and air traffic at the O-D level (Goolsbee & Syverson 2008).”
- Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership (2018, unknown): “Following Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), we weight the market-carrier-level regressions by average passengers for the market and carrier over time and cluster standard errors at the market level.”
- Product Positioning and Competition: The Role of Location in the Fast Food Industry (2007, result): “Hauser (1988) shows that similar results can be obtained for a small number of firms from the defender model of Hauser and Shugan (1983).”
- Does Competition Reduce Price Dispersion? New Evidence from the Airline Industry (2009, unknown): “…with total enplaned passengers on the route and two instruments used in Borenstein and Rose (1994).25 We cluster our standard errors by route, as in Goolsbee and Syverson (2005), in order to control for both serial correlation and correlation between the pricing decisions of multiple carriers on…”
- Price‐increasing competition (2008, unknown): “If follows from pd = 0 and Assumption 3 that pd pm if (pm) 0; and, conversely, pd pm if (pm) 0: Note further that the rst-order condition for the monopoly problem implies (p) Z v pm [G (vjv) G (pjv)] f (v) dv (p c) Z v pm [g (vjv) g (pjv)] f (v) dv : (11) Therefore, we have the following comparison”