Mutual monitoring and corporate governance

By Zhichuan Frank Li. 2014

117 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dd8ebc770dad63dd3d86f06dc5c03d3e99f7c15a

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Citations in the corpus

An Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Performance with Moderating Effects of CEO Power and Ownership Structure: A Case Study of the Manufacturing Sector of Pakistan (2019, background): “Moreover, ZF Li [108] highlights the beneﬁts of mutual monitoring; for example, the agency problem can be mitigated by mutual monitoring by a highly organized authority.”
Study on the Relationship between CSR and Financial Performance (2019, background): “Third, introducing a channel, for example corporate governance mechanisms [126,127], through which corporate investment in CSR affect corporate financial performance might yield more comprehensive results.”
Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, methodology): “Finally, we control for non-CEO skills in Table 6, following Masulis and Zhang (2012).”
Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance: The Moderating Role of Ownership Concentration in Turkey (2019, background): “In their study, Li [31] investigated mutual monitoring as a corporate governance proxy and demonstrated that mutual monitoring by the second executive of a firm is positively related to Tobin’s Q.”
Corporate Social Performance and Firm Performance: Comparative Study among Developed and Emerging Market Firms (2019, background): “The beneficial effect of mutual monitoring on firm value was more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance than those with strong corporate governance [74].”
Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation for Corporate Social Responsibility (2015, unknown): “The results suggest that providing incentives for CSR to managers may be effective in improving firm social performance.”
CEO Power, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Firm Value: A Test of Agency Theory (2016, unknown): “Li (2014a) finds that the combination of firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the addition of more”
Endogeneity in CEO power: A survey and experiment (2016, unknown): “The GAP is better because the No.2 person in each firm is the most important executive to check and balance the CEO’s power (Li, 2014); therefore, the No.2 is the most relevant executive in this empirical design.”