Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firms

By Gérard Roland. 2000

726 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dd66711f82f76407ca4a20de3fafdf8e2fa463b1

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Citations in the corpus

The Finnish Great Depression: From Russia with Love (2012, unknown): “Indeed, Roland (2000) argues that politicians could not allow wages to fall too fast and too much because otherwise reforms could be reversed.”
Services Policy Reform and Economic Growth in Transition Economies, 1990-2004 (2005, unknown): “Transition economies experienced large swings in investment in the first half of the 1990s, with the collapse of central planning and the initial lack of market institutions leading to sharp reductions in investment (Roland, 2000; Falcetti et al, 2002).”
Institutional reform and economic growth of China: 40-year progress toward marketization (2019, background): “The impact of market-oriented reforms on economic growth has been of great interest in transition economies since the early 1990s (Roland 2000; Jia – Chao 2015).”
Institutions: Rules or Equilibria? (2011, unknown): “3For example, Roland (2000), Aoki (2001), Qian (2003).”
Decentralization and Political Institutions (2007, background): “In the beginning of transition, many post-communist countries experienced “initial” output fall, deterioration in quality of public goods, and economic decentralization (Roland, 2000).”
Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia (2000, unknown): “…Turning to the first of the two parameters which reflect the structure of federalism, a number of recent studies have provided some evidence on a, both for Russia and for China.3 In desOribing the evidence, we need to distinguish between the three levels of government, central, regional and local.”
Who are Russia's Entrepreneurs? (2005, background): “May 2005 3(2–3):587–597 © 2005 by the European Economic Association “zwu0247” — 2005/5/21 — page 588 — #2 research has primarily emphasized the role of credit constraints for the poor (Banerjee and Newman 1993) and the security of property rights (Besley 1995; Che and Qian 1998; De Soto 2000; Djanko”
On the Growth Effect of Stock Market Liberalizations (2009, unknown): “ownership reform (Roland (2000)), and may be similarly important in financial market reforms in developing countries.”
Institutional Strategies in Emerging Markets (2015, background): “…changes that often characterize emerging market contexts embody complex economic and social processes that are still little understood (Roland, 2000) – which has prompted calls for more research adopting institutional perspectives (Child & Lu, 1996; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, 2003;…”
Credible Commitment and Property Rights: Evidence from Russia (2004, background): “…contacts” was a benefit of membership was significantly associated with extending credit and planning new capital investment. clarifying competing claims to assets, but supporting institutions are needed to significantly reduce the costs of exercising property rights (Roland 2000; Stiglitz 1999).”
Comparing the Impact of Credit Constraints on the Growth of SMEs in a Transition Country with an Established Market Economy (2006, background): “Absent from this picture was the presence of small and medium sized enterprises (Roland, 2000).”