Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia

By Olivier J. Blanchard, A. Shleifer. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 2000

842 citations recorded by the source corpus.

In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regula or corruption. We argue that the difference can be traced to lies in the degree of political centralization present in China, but not in Russia. In China the central government has been strong and disciplined enough to induce local governments to favor growth. In Russia, it has not. We agree, but with an important caveat. We believe the experience of Russia indicates that another ingredient is crucial, namely political centralization.

Subfields: Gender Studies, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d1315be4dc76c3cb668b7b6081d26bccad47eead

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Citations in the corpus

GDP management to meet or beat growth targets (2018, background): “In China, the readiness of the Chinese central government to reward and punish local officials on the basis of their economic performance creates a similar motivation for the local officials (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001).”
Yardstick competition in a Federation: Theory and Evidence from China (2012, background): “Following Blanchard and Shleifer (2001), we argue that vertical control can ensure accountability of local governors and induce interjurisdictional competition.”
New local state power through administrative restructuring – A case study of post-Mao China county-level urban entrepreneurialism in Kunshan (2013, background): “neous with political centralization under the party, Chinese entrepreneurial city authorities are motivated, both politically and materially, to utilize their economic decentralization powers to generate more of the gross domestic product (GDP), accommodate greater foreign direct investment (FDI), a”
Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style (2005, background): “In addition to fiscal incentives, political incentives facing local governments also matter in comparing the Chinese and Russian federalism (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000).”
The Political Economy of Development in China and Vietnam (2014, background): “…have connected the gradualism to their growth trajectories by arguing that flexible, intermediate institutions allowed C&V to respond more rapidly to unanticipated problems while simultaneously building new coalitions for further reform (Woo 1994, Blanchard & Shleifer 2001, Svejnar 2008).”
Political promotion and labor investment efficiency (2018, background): “Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) find that the Chinese central government is willing to reward or punish local officials based on the economic performance in their region for promoting local economic development.”
Special Issue on Corporate Transformation in the People's Republic of China: The Institutional Effects on Strategic Alliance Partner Selection in Transition Economies: China vs. Russia (2004, background): “The differences in their institutional environments are partially due to the different approaches to transition that each has taken (Blanchard and Shleifer 2001). Russia chose a rapid transition to a market-based economy, while China implemented a more evolutionary approach. However, Blanchard and S”
Political Institutions and Financial Development: An Empirical Study (2010, background): ““Premature” democracy in developing countries possibly lowers the economic growth rate, and even results in economic disorder, political instability, and ethnic conflict (Blanchard & Shleifer, 2000; Persson & Tabellini, 1992).”
State ownership, institutional effects and value creation in cross-border mergers & acquisitions by Chinese firms (2015, neutral): “Our results are consistent with the findings of Boateng et al. (2008) in the case of China; Gubbi et al.”