Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy
By R. J. Gilson. 2005
259 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dcf553514fc773eafe5fd541d74c44ece5155b09
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In Accounting
- M. Carney
- Marc van Essen
- Stephen G. Sapp
- Vanessa M. Strike
- Praveen Kumar
- Hadiye Aslan
- Mike W. Peng
- Alfredo De Massis
Citations in the corpus
- Strategic Ownership Structure and the Cost of Debt (2012, background): “3 In particular, there is considerable evidence that tunneling by dominant shareholders can hurt creditors (Johnson et al. 2000; Gilson 2006; Jiang, Lee, and Yue 2010), and firm characteristics that influence strategic decisions regarding default and debt renegotiations significantly affect credit s”
- Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence (2009, unknown): “, Jensen (1986, 1989), Gilson (2006), Roe (2002). (Since the correlation between block premiums and ownership concentration is only about .”
- The Resilient Family Firm: Stakeholder Outcomes and Institutional Effects (2015, background): “While legal protection offered to business owners, minority investors, and employees consists of both general and specific degrees of protection (Gilson, 2006; Heugens et al., 2009; van Essen et al., 2013a), rule of law represents the general degree of legal protection offered to all stakeholders (K”