Earnings Manipulation Risk, Corporate Governance Risk, and Auditors' Planning and Pricing Decisions

By Jean C. Bedard, Karla M. Johnstone. 2004

671 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dce80d4436396bbf1ad64979b5f00b29a3e7994b

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Citations in the corpus

Geographic Proximity between Auditor and Client: How Does it Impact Audit Quality? (2012, background): “2 For example, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) show that auditors adjust their audit planning when auditors perceive that a client has an increased risk of earnings management.”
The empirical relationship between ownership characteristics and audit fees (2007, background): “7 In a recent study, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) document that auditors increase their engagement efforts and billing rates for clients when corporate governance is weak and when earnings manipulation risk is relatively high.”
Audit Markets, Fees and Production: Towards an Integrated View of Empirical Audit Research (2011, neutral): “The findings of Bedard and Johnstone [2004] are mixed in that they find no association between corporate governance risk and planned audit labor, but find a significant association between internal controls and planned audit labor.”
Audit Market Concentration, Audit Fees, and Audit Quality: Evidence from China (2016, background): “When clients are risky, auditors apply more audit plans and resources in audit procedures, leading to higher audit fees (Johnstone and Bedard 2001; Niemi 2002; Bedard and Johnstone 2004).”
Corporate Governance, Integrated Reporting and the Use of Credibility-enhancing Mechanisms on Integrated Reports (2019, background): “In contrast, the supply-based perspective argues that well-governed companies are characterized by lower misreporting risks and stronger internal control, and thereby auditors are more likely to reduce the extent of audit and audit fees (e.g. Bedard & Johnstone, 2004; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009).”
Is the effect of industry expertise on audit pricing an office-level or a partner-level phenomenon? (2014, neutral): “Nonetheless, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) suggest that audit pricing decisions are made by individual members of engagement teams.”
The Corporate Governance Mosaic and Financial Reporting Quality (2008, positive): “Bedard and Johnstone (2004) investigate the impact of earnings manipulation risk and corporate governance risk (e.”
Materiality Judgments and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements: The Role of Managers, Auditors, and Audit Committees (2012, result): “This interpretation is consistent with Bedard and Johnstone (2004), who find a positive association between audit effort, fees, and earnings management risk, which auditors judge to be commonly associated with a history of exactly”
Audit quality, debt financing, and earnings management: Evidence from Jordan (2017, background): “In terms of audit fees (AF), Bédard and Johnstone (2004) revealed that auditors increase efforts as well as billing rates for clients, accompanied by earnings manipulation.”